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Abstract
In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can
satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points
out that “solutions” to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as
predictions of what would be “resting points” for a game in the way stable
coalition structures are usually interpreted.
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1 Introduction
A challenging question in game theory is to predict what coalitions will form
in games where there is room for cooperation, but also reasons for the grand
coalition not to be formed. A number of solutions have been proposed (see,
for example, Chwe, 1994, Xue, 1998, Diamantoudi and Xue, 2000, Barbera` and
Gerber, 2003) but each one of them is subject to some criticism. Interestingly,
this criticism does not aim at the plausibility of the coalition structures that are
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selected by the solution but rather at the underlying rationale for the selection.
Most solutions for coalition formation games incorporate some notion of farsight-
edness while keeping the idea of stability that is inherent in the core. Coalitions
are farsighted, if they take into account that any deviation can trigger further
deviations so that the initial deviators may or may not end up in a situation
which they prefer over the original one. Here lies the core of the problem faced
by the proposed solution concepts: they appeal to the dynamic nature of coali-
tion formation without specifying an order of moves or determining probabilities
with which certain transitions are expected to arise.1 Hence, it is easy to con-
struct examples where the prediction of a solution seems unreasonable because it
relies on the potential occurrence of a highly implausible and therefore unlikely
chain of deviations.2 A remedy clearly would be to model coalition formation as
a noncooperative game, where the order of moves and the set of actions available
to any coalition are clearly specified. However, this approach suffers from the
fact that there is no naturally given game form for a coalition formation problem
and that the set of Nash equilibria may be very sensitive to the specific details
of the game.
Hence, in this note we go back to the tradition of cooperative game theory,
which leaves out the details of the game and instead tries to characterize a solution
by the properties of the coalition structures it selects. It turns out that already
a short list of desirable requirements leads to an impossibility result: there does
not exist any solution concept that satisfies all of them at the same time. The
axioms we propose are compelling, whenever one views the elements of a solution
as “resting points,” in the sense that once they are reached, they will persist.
Some authors present their solutions in a different vein: as part of a permanent
rotation (Konishi and Ray, 2003) or as the set of coalition structures that will
stick longer than others (Barbera` and Gerber, 2003). Our result does not quarrel
with these solutions, as long as they are properly interpreted, and not taken as
predictions of coalition structures that will stay forever, once they are reached.
1A notable exception is the approach taken by Konishi and Ray (2003) who study a dynamic
process of coalition formation with endogenous transition probabilities.
2Chwe (1994) provides a number of examples illustrating this point for the largest consistent
set.
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Before engaging in much formalism, we consider, as an example, a simple hedonic
game. This example will allow us to discuss informally all the issues involved, to
introduce all the axioms we propose, and it will later be used in the formal proof
of our result.
A hedonic game is given by (N ; (ºi)i∈N), where N is the finite set of players,
and ºi is a complete and transitive preference relation on Si(N) = {S ⊂ N | i ∈
S} for all i ∈ N . Strict preference will be denoted by Âi. A set ∅ 6= S ⊂ N is
called a coalition. A coalition structure S on N is a partition of N into disjoint
coalitions. By P we denote the set of all coalition structures on N . Let S(i,S )
be the coalition inS ∈ P that contains player i. Let G be a set of hedonic games.
A solution on G is a correspondence Γ : G ³ P . Hence, a solution assigns to
each hedonic game in G a (possibly empty) set of coalition structures S ∈ P .
Any element of Γ(G) will be called stable for G ∈ G.
Consider the following example of a three-player hedonic game, which is some-
times called the “roommate-problem.”3 Let players’ preferences be such that
{1, 3} Â1 {1, 2} Â1 {1} Â1 {1, 2, 3},
{1, 2} Â2 {2, 3} Â2 {2} Â2 {1, 2, 3},
{2, 3} Â3 {1, 3} Â3 {3} Â3 {1, 2, 3}.
(1)
We will use a simplified notation for coalition structures and write, for example,
[ 12 | 3 ] for the coalition structure {{1, 2}, {3}}. The possible coalition structures
in this game are
[ 1 | 2 | 3 ], [ 12 | 3 ], [ 13 | 2 ], [ 23 | 1 ], [ 123 ].
Which coalition structures could be considered a solution in this game? First of
all, for a coalition structure to belong to the solution it must be that this structure
is not Pareto dominated by any other. The rationale is simple: if some agents
are to gain from re-organizing the society while the rest are indifferent, then the
status quo cannot be stable, since everyone would agree to that re-organization.
In our example, Pareto efficiency rules out the grand coalition and the coalition
structures where all agents are alone.
3Observe that this game is different from Gale and Shapley’s (1962) roommate problem,
where four players can split into groups of two.
3
A second natural requirement on a solution is symmetry. Take a game, where
we can permute the players such that the permuted game coincides with the
original game. Then, if one coalition structure is stable, the permuted coalition
structure should also be stable. By Pareto efficiency we had already discarded
all coalition structures as candidates for stable structures except for those where
two agents are together and the remaining one is alone. Symmetry then tells us
that all these three coalition structures must be stable or none of them can be.
We have already mentioned that solutions to coalition formation games are
problematic, and one of the reasons is because, if we want to have an all-embracing
theory, it must always select at least one coalition structure as the solution. This
requirement is also one of our axioms: for all games, we require that a solution
concept provides for at least one stable coalition structure. In general, coalition
structures in the core of the coalition formation game would be great candidates
for a solution (though not necessarily the only ones). But since the core is empty
unless one imposes strong assumptions on the domain of games (see Banerjee,
Konishi, and So¨nmez, 2001, and Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002), it has rather
limited predictive power. For our example, the only possibilities left by the
preceding axioms were to either identify three stable coalition structures or none.
Now we are left with only one option: that of retaining the three coalitional
structures [ 12 | 3 ], [ 13 | 2 ], [ 23 | 1 ] as the solution for the game.
Yet, this candidate solution fails to meet our last requirement, which we will
call self-consistency and which is reminiscent of the notion of internal stability
in the definition of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set (von Neumann and
Morgenstern, 1944). In a nutshell, what the condition requires is that there
should be no obvious incentive for agents to break one coalition structure in the
solution in favor of another coalition structure also belonging to the solution. Let
us be more precise about the reasons for such a requirement. When comparing
two coalition structures S and S ′ we may want to look at those agents, who
would prefer to form a coalition S ′ ∈ S ′, rather than staying in those where they
belong to inS. These agents can be seen as those interested in moving fromS to
S ′. In general, though, there is no guarantee that these agents alone can enforce
the passage from one coalition structure to the other. This is why we concentrate
on those cases where the passage from S to S ′ is enforceable by the interested
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parties alone. There are at least two cases where enforceability is unquestionable.
One is when all coalitions in S ′ are potential movers who will be happy to move.
The other case is when all coalitions in S ′ but one are potential movers, and the
remaining coalition is a singleton: all others will be willing to move, as before,
and the leftover agent cannot do anything else but staying alone. Let us now state
more formally our fourth requirement on a solution. If S andS ′ are stable, then
it cannot be that a family of coalitions can enforce S ′ and that all their members
prefer S ′ to S . We are aware that this axiom may be more controversial than
the rest. Hence, we would like to elaborate on its rationale. First of all, there may
be many cases where the interests and the action of some agents alone cannot
fully define the consequences for a change in coalition structures. This is why
we limit attention to those cases where the interested agents can clearly enforce
a change, as already mentioned before. Then, we claim that our requirement is
necessary for a set of stable coalition structures to be interpretable as a set of
resting points, because of the combination of two facts. One is that we demand
the set of agents who improve away from a stable coalition structure to do so in
one shot. The other is that we require the improvement to be attained at another
coalition structure which is also stable. Notice that the existence of a one-shot
gain is not enough to disqualify the starting coalition structure as being stable,
since it could be that the ensuing change was transient, and that agents might
be deterred by the threat of further change to the worse. But this would require
the arrival structure after the first shot to be unstable, in contradiction with
the assumption that it belongs to the solution. If, on the contrary, we insist in
considering the arrival structure as a final resting point, then we are left without
arguments to consider the initial one as stable. Either one or the other coalition
structure fails to pass the requirement. Notice that our requirement is weak,
since it only involves limited (enforceable) moves and one-shot gains. A notion of
stability meeting the requirement may still be criticized on other grounds: moves
that are not enforceable in our restricted sense may still be considered possible,
and more complex chains of disruptive moves may be conceived. Our point is
that the proposed requirement is minimal, if one accepts our terms of reference.
If we now go back to our example, we can see that each one of our three
candidates to be a stable coalition structure dominates one of the others. Hence,
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the choice of these three, which is required by the conjunction of the remaining
axioms, is precluded by the last one: there cannot exist any solution satisfying
all the axioms we have stated. In the following section we will formally present
our impossibility result.
2 An Impossibility Theorem
Let C be a set of coalitions. Then C can enforce S ∈ P , if
S =
⋃
S∈C
{S} or S =
⋃
S∈C
{S}
 ∪ {i} for some i ∈ N.
We say that S ′ dominates S , if there exists a set of coalitions C, such that
1. C can enforce S ′,
2. For all S ∈ C either
S(i,S ′) Âi S(i,S ) for all i ∈ S,
or
S Âi T for all i ∈ S and for all T ∈ Si(N) \ {S},
i.e. either all members of S ∈ C strictly prefer S ′ over S or they strictly
prefer S over any other coalition.4
Let Γ be a solution on some set of hedonic games G. Consider the following
axioms.
A1 (Nonemptiness) Γ(G) 6= ∅ for all G ∈ G.
A2 (Symmetry) If G = (N ; (ºi)i∈N) ∈ G is such that there exists a permu-
tation pi on N with
S ºi T ⇐⇒ pi(S) ºpi(i) pi(T ),
4In the latter case S is a top coalition of N (see Banerjee, Konishi, and So¨nmez, 2001) and
the members of S have no reason to veto against the move from S to S ′.
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for all i ∈ N and for all S, T ∈ Si(N), then
S ∈ Γ(G) ⇐⇒ pi(S ) ∈ Γ(G).5
A3 (Pareto Optimality) Let G ∈ G and S ∈ Γ(G). Then there does not
exist S ′ ∈ P , such that S(i,S ′) ºi S(i,S ) for all i ∈ N , with a strict
inequality for at least one i.
A4 (Self-Consistency) Let G ∈ G and S, S ′ ∈ Γ(G). Then S does not
dominate S ′ and S ′ does not dominate S .
Let D be a set of hedonic games with player set N , that includes all games
with strict preferences, i.e. all (N ; (ºi)i∈N) with S Âi T or T Âi S, for all
S, T ∈ Si(N), S 6= T , and for all i ∈ N .
Theorem 2.1 If #N ≥ 3, then there does not exist a solution on D which
satisfies A1-A4.
Proof: Consider the following game G ∈ D which is an embedding of our
introductory example into an n-player game with n ≥ 3. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n}
and let preferences satisfy (1) and {i} Âi S for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and all S ∈
Si(N) \ {i} with S 6= {i, j} for all j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, j 6= i. Moreover, let
{i} Âi S for all S ∈ Si(N) \ {i}, and for all i /∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Then, by (A1), (A2) and (A3), Γ(G) = {S1,S2,S3}, whereS1 =
[
12 | 3 | 4 | . . . |n
]
,
S2 =
[
13 | 2 | 4 | . . . |n
]
and S3 =
[
23 | 1 | 4 | . . . |n
]
. But then (A4) is violated
since, for example, S2 dominates S1 .
¤
5If pi : N → N is a permutation, then we define pi(S) := {j | j = pi(i) for some i ∈ S} for
any coalition S and pi(S ) := {T |T = pi(S) for some S ∈ S } for any coalition structure S.
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3 Conclusion
Our paper emphasizes that it is impossible to define a fully satisfactory notion of
stability for hedonic coalition formation games. This is the case if one interprets
the fact that a coalition structure is stable as a prediction that the corresponding
coalitions will persist, once they are formed. There are essentially two routes to
take as a consequence of this impossibility result. One route is to abandon one
of our axioms in order to recover the existence of a solution. However, it seems
difficult to give preference to a subset of the axioms since all reflect very desirable
properties. The other route is to attribute a different, probabilistic interpreta-
tion to the solution of a hedonic game, where the elements of the solution are
not considered to be persistent but rather to be the support of some long-run
distribution on the set of coalition structures.6 We hope that this note initiates
a new discussion of solutions to coalition formation games along these lines.
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